A distinct chapter in Czechoslovak diplomacy was its role in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (1953–1993), where Czechoslovakia, alongside Poland, was nominated by the North Korean side, while the UN appointed Switzerland and Sweden; the states’ neutrality derived from their non-involvement in combat operations during the conflict. The commission was tasked with supervising compliance with the Armistice Agreement conditions, particularly any arms distribution. The Repatriation Commission, with the same member-states joined by India as chair, operated for six months post-armistice to oversee POW camps, inform prisoners about repatriation options, and facilitate prisoner exchanges. Over forty years, around six hundred Czechoslovaks served in the NNSC, mostly in the early years when the state approached the mission as ideological warfare on enemy territory. Due to Chinese intervention, the size of the Czechoslovak and Polish commissions was reduced and gradually further limited; from 1957, only a 17-member delegation remained in Korea, with their activities being more or less only formal. Czechoslovakia’s NNSC participation ended after the country’s dissolution, as the DPRK refused to recognize the Czech Republic’s succession.

The main group initially operated at ten fixed inspection posts: in North Korea at ports and airports in Sinŭiju, Ch’ŏngjin, Hŭngnam, Manp’o, Sinanju; in South Korea at Pusan, Taegu, Inch’ŏn, Kangnŭng, and Kunsan. Ten additional “mobile” groups served as reserves. Mobile commissions were soon disbanded, and the delegation concentrated in the village of P’anmunjŏm in the demilitarized zone. By 1956, the original goal to monitor the armistice and arms movements was abandoned, shifting the NNSC’s role from military to largely diplomatic functions. The commission helped resolve Armistice Agreement violations and bilateral disputes. Internal reports indicate that DPRK obstruction — via false information and insufficient assistance — frequently hampered operations. By the late 1950s, it even significantly restricted delegation members’ freedom of movement.

Beyond joint meetings, training, and standard work programs, the commission spent time with other delegates on social gatherings and performative cultural-diplomatic events that bore little relation to its original duties. In the 1950s, this program predominated.